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The U.S. Approach to Corporate Monopolies: A Comprehensive Analysis of Antitrust Law and Enforcement in the Digital Age

The concentration of economic power in the hands of a few dominant corporations poses a fundamental challenge to the principles of fair competition and democratic market structures. Just as the separation of powers in government serves as a bulwark against tyranny, a robust system of checks and balances in the economy is essential to prevent the undue influence of monopolies. In this report, a detailed examination of the United States' legal, institutional, and philosophical approach to this issue is presented. The U.S. model is not a static solution but a dynamic and evolving framework that offers a compelling case study for addressing market concentration, particularly in the modern digital economy.

Part I: The Foundational Pillars of U.S. Antitrust Policy

The American approach to antitrust is built upon a trilogy of federal statutes enacted to preserve competition and prevent anticompetitive conduct. These laws, enforced by a dual-agency system and supported by private action, form a comprehensive and adaptable framework.

Chapter 1: The Core Legal Framework

The core of U.S. antitrust law rests on three principal statutes: the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890: A Charter for Competition The Sherman Act was the first federal measure to outlaw monopolistic business practices, establishing a "comprehensive charter of economic liberty".1 It is divided into two key sections. Section 1: Restraint of Trade. This section broadly prohibits "every contract, combination... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce".2 While the language is sweeping, judicial interpretation has narrowed its scope, prohibiting only those restraints that are deemed "unreasonable".1 Certain egregious acts, such as agreements among competitors to fix prices or wages, rig bids, or allocate customers, are considered so harmful to competition that they are deemed "per se" illegal.5 This means no defense or justification is permitted. In contrast, most other agreements, like exclusive contracts, are evaluated under the more flexible "rule of reason," which requires a fact-specific inquiry into a defendant's market power and the overall effect of the agreement on competition.1 Section 2: Monopolization. This section makes it illegal to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize" a market.2 A critical distinction is made here: simply possessing a monopoly is not unlawful. An unlawful monopoly exists when a firm has obtained or maintained its market power not through superior products or business acumen, but through "exclusionary" or anticompetitive conduct that suppresses rivals.4 The law targets the actions taken to acquire or maintain a dominant position, rather than the position itself. The Clayton Act of 1914: Preventing Anticompetitive Practices and Mergers Passed to supplement the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act aims to prevent competitive harm before it occurs by prohibiting specific actions that could restrict competition.5 Its key prohibitions include: Anticompetitive Mergers: The Act prohibits mergers or acquisitions that "may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly".5 This is a forward-looking provision designed to stop harmful consolidation before it damages the market. Tying Agreements: These are arrangements where a company forces a customer to buy one product (the tying product) in order to purchase a second, distinct product (the tied product).5 This practice restricts consumer choice and can leverage a firm's market power in one area to gain dominance in another. Predatory Pricing: The Act prohibits setting prices very low, often below cost, to drive competitors out of business, with the intent of raising prices once competition is eliminated.5 Interlocking Directorates: The law also prohibits an individual from serving on the boards of competing corporations, a practice that could lessen competitive vigor.5 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act: A Complementary Enforcement Tool This law, also passed in 1914, created the independent Federal Trade Commission (FTC).1 The FTC Act gives the agency the authority to investigate and prevent "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices".1 The FTC can bring civil cases against activities that violate the Sherman Act, though it does not technically enforce the Sherman Act itself.1

Chapter 2: The Enforcers: DOJ, FTC, and their Shared Jurisdiction

The enforcement of these federal statutes is primarily carried out by two agencies: the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). This dual-agency structure is a defining feature of the American system, creating a built-in separation of enforcement powers. The Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division: This division is responsible for enforcing federal antitrust laws and is the only entity with the authority to bring criminal charges, such as for the most egregious violations like price-fixing.5 Historically, the DOJ has played a critical role in challenging and dismantling large monopolies, including the iconic breakups of Standard Oil and AT&T.10 Its authority extends to civil actions to halt anticompetitive practices and to remedy violations. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC): A Multi-Faceted Regulator: As an independent agency, the FTC's role is focused on civil enforcement and promoting consumer protection. The agency concentrates its resources on industries with high consumer spending, including technology, healthcare, and energy.1 While both agencies share jurisdiction, their expertise and strategic focus often lead to a division of labor. Cooperation and Division of Responsibilities: The DOJ and FTC have overlapping authority but coordinate to avoid duplicating efforts. A key mechanism for this cooperation is the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act, which mandates that companies report proposed mergers and acquisitions that meet certain size thresholds to both agencies for review.11 This pre-merger notification program serves as a critical proactive measure. The agencies conduct a preliminary review within a set waiting period (typically 30 days) and may issue a "second request" for a more detailed investigation if antitrust concerns are identified.11 The majority of deals are cleared after the initial review, but the threat of a second request or a lawsuit is a powerful deterrent against anticompetitive mergers. The structure of U.S. antitrust enforcement itself embodies a system of checks and balances. The existence of two separate enforcement agencies with distinct but overlapping powers ensures that no single entity holds a monopoly on the power to regulate markets.1 Furthermore, the legal framework is not solely dependent on government action. Private parties harmed by an antitrust violation can also file civil lawsuits and, if successful, may recover treble damages—triple the amount of damages incurred.6 This decentralized, multi-layered system, encompassing legal statutes, dual enforcement agencies, and private action, establishes a robust set of checks on private economic power, a concept that mirrors the user's initial analogy of the separation of government powers. The legal doctrine itself has evolved over time. The Sherman Act, initially "loosely worded and failed to define" critical terms 2, forced the judiciary and enforcement agencies to define its meaning. The judicial creation of the per se rule for certain actions and the rule of reason for others allowed the law to adapt to new and unforeseen market structures, from the industrial trusts of the 19th century to the complex digital platforms of the modern era.1 Law Year Enacted Primary Focus Key Provisions/Prohibitions Primary Enforcers Remedies Sherman Act 1890 Restraint of Trade & Monopolization Price-fixing, Monopolization, Bid-rigging DOJ, Private Parties Criminal sanctions, Civil injunctions, Fines, Divestiture Clayton Act 1914 Anticompetitive Practices & Mergers Anticompetitive mergers, Tying agreements, Predatory pricing, Interlocking Directorates DOJ, FTC, Private Parties Injunctions, Divestiture, Treble damages (private suits) FTC Act 1914 Unfair Methods of Competition Unfair or deceptive acts and practices FTC Cease-and-desist orders, Injunctions

Part II: Enforcement in Action: A Historical and Contemporary Look

To understand how the American model operates, it is essential to examine its application through key historical and contemporary cases. These examples illustrate the system's adaptability and the philosophical shifts that have guided its enforcement over time.

Chapter 3: Addressing a Traditional Monopoly: The Breakup of AT&T

The 1984 breakup of American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) serves as the quintessential example of U.S. antitrust enforcement targeting a traditional, utility-style monopoly. For decades, AT&T, or "Ma Bell," was the dominant provider of telephone services, having eliminated independent competitors by refusing to interconnect its long-distance network with their local systems.14 Historical Context and Allegations: In 1974, the DOJ filed a lawsuit against AT&T under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, alleging that the company had engaged in a variety of anticompetitive practices. These included refusing to interconnect with independent phone companies and delaying or refusing to connect competitors' equipment to its network.14 The company insisted that customers use its own "protective coupling devices" on non-AT&T phones, which it was slow to supply, effectively harming competitors' businesses.15 The Lasting Legacy: From Lawsuit to Divestiture: After years of legal battles, the case culminated in a landmark 1982 settlement. AT&T agreed to a structural remedy: it would divest its local service operations into seven independent regional companies, nicknamed the "Baby Bells".14 The goal of this forced fragmentation was to reintroduce competition into the industry.14 The breakup fundamentally changed the telecommunications landscape, ushering in an era of competition, although local service competition remained limited until the rise of cell phones and internet telephony.14 The case demonstrated the government's willingness to pursue a fundamental restructuring of a dominant company to restore market competition.

Chapter 4: The Ideological Evolution of Antitrust

The history of U.S. antitrust is marked by a pendulum swing of philosophical approaches, which provides the crucial context for understanding the current challenges in the digital age. The Rise of the Chicago School and the Consumer Welfare Standard: Starting in the 1970s, a new intellectual movement known as the "Chicago School" gained influence.16 This school of thought, with proponents like Robert Bork and Richard Posner, believed in the supremacy of the self-correcting market and argued for a narrowly tailored enforcement standard focused exclusively on economic efficiency and metrics like price and output.16 The core tenet was the "consumer welfare standard," which prioritized low prices above all else. According to this view, monopolies that achieved their dominance through efficiencies and offered lower prices were not inherently harmful, and government intervention was a greater risk than market power.16 This philosophy led to a period of more passive antitrust enforcement, as courts and regulators became more reluctant to intervene unless clear evidence of consumer price harm could be shown. The Emergence of the New Brandeis Movement: The perceived shortcomings of the Chicago School approach, particularly in the face of increasingly concentrated markets and the rise of "free" digital products, led to the emergence of the "New Brandeis" or "Neo-Progressive" movement.18 This modern movement, inspired by early 20th-century Justice Louis Brandeis, argues that excessively centralized private power is dangerous not just for economic reasons, but for political and social ones as well.18 It rejects the narrow focus on short-term price effects and advocates for a broader approach that considers the effects of market power on innovation, labor markets, and the ability of new competitors to emerge.18 Proponents of this view, including figures like Lina Khan, believe that antitrust laws should focus more on market structure to promote true competition.

Chapter 5: Tackling Modern Digital Monopolies: The Cases of Google and Meta

The philosophical shift toward a more structuralist view of competition has directly informed the most significant antitrust lawsuits of the modern era, which target dominant technology companies. The user's concern about companies like Naver is reflected in the U.S. government's focus on companies that control the foundational platforms of the digital economy. The United States vs. Google: The DOJ has filed two major lawsuits against Google since 2020. One alleges that Google illegally monopolized the search engine market by using exclusionary contracts with device makers and browsers to ensure its search engine was the default option.20 A separate 2023 lawsuit targets Google's alleged monopoly in the digital advertising technology (ad tech) market. The DOJ claims Google achieved and maintained this dominance through anticompetitive behaviors, including illegally tying its ad server to its ad exchange, which disadvantaged rivals and allowed it to raise ad prices.8 A recent ruling in the ad tech case found that Google had formed an illegal monopoly, a significant precedent-setting development.8 The remedies sought in both lawsuits include a potential breakup of Google's business units and the divestiture of significant portions of its ad tech business.8 The FTC vs. Meta: The FTC's lawsuit against Meta (formerly Facebook) centers on the company's acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp.20 The FTC alleges that these acquisitions were a "deliberate strategy to eliminate emerging competitors" and to cement Meta's monopoly in the personal social networking market.20 The central legal battle in this case revolves around defining the relevant market. Meta argues that it faces robust competition from platforms like TikTok, YouTube, and Apple's iMessage, while the FTC contends that the market is narrowly defined as "personal social networking applications".20 The remedy sought is a structural one: forcing Meta to divest from both Instagram and WhatsApp to break up the conglomerate.20 A compelling parallel can be drawn between the AT&T breakup and the ongoing lawsuits against Google. In the case of AT&T, the company was accused of leveraging its control over the physical "pipes" of the telecommunications network to suppress competition in adjacent markets like phone equipment and long-distance service.14 Similarly, the lawsuits against Google allege that the company uses its control over the digital "pipes" of the internet—search and ad tech—to suppress competition and innovation in related services. The request for a structural remedy, such as the divestiture of business units, in the Google case is directly informed by the historical precedent of the AT&T breakup. This new wave of antitrust enforcement is a direct consequence of the philosophical shift away from the Chicago School's strict consumer welfare standard.16 The Chicago School doctrine struggled to prove consumer harm in markets where products are "free." The modern cases, however, argue that harm is not limited to higher prices; it also manifests as stifled innovation, reduced consumer choice, and the elimination of potential competitors, as seen in the FTC's allegations that Meta acquired Instagram and WhatsApp to "buy-or-bury" threats.20 This re-evaluation of what constitutes harm in the digital economy is the primary driver of the current enforcement actions. Case Name Plaintiff(s) Core Allegations Alleged Violation(s) Alleged Harm Remedy Sought Status United States v. Google (Search) DOJ & States Illegally monopolized search engine market through exclusionary contracts Sherman Act §2 Suppressed competition, stifled innovation, and limited consumer choice Potential breakup of business units Ongoing trial United States v. Google (Ad Tech) DOJ & States Illegally monopolized digital ad tech market by tying products Sherman Act §1,2 Reduced transparency, raised ad prices, limited rivals' revenues Divestiture of significant portions of ad tech business Ongoing trial FTC v. Meta Platforms, Inc. FTC & States Illegally maintained social networking monopoly by acquiring rivals (Instagram & WhatsApp) Clayton Act §7, FTC Act Elimination of emerging competitors, "buy-or-bury" strategy Forced divestiture of Instagram & WhatsApp Ongoing trial

Part III: Mechanisms, Challenges, and Insights for a New Era

The American system is a complex machinery of proactive and reactive enforcement, employing a range of tools to address market concentration.

Chapter 6: The Tools of Enforcement and Remedy

U.S. antitrust law provides a spectrum of remedies to address anticompetitive behavior, ranging from preventing harmful mergers before they occur to retroactively restructuring markets. Proactive Enforcement: Merger Review under the HSR Act: The HSR Act is the cornerstone of proactive enforcement. It requires parties to large mergers and acquisitions to file a notification with the DOJ and FTC and observe a waiting period while the agencies review the deal for potential anticompetitive effects.11 This mechanism provides a crucial opportunity to prevent consolidation that could harm competition, allowing the agencies to either let the deal proceed, issue a "second request" for more information, or take legal action to block it.11 Remedies for Monopolization and Anticompetitive Practices: Once a violation is proven, courts can impose a range of remedies to restore competition. Structural Remedies: The most significant and impactful remedy is divestiture, which involves forcing a company to sell off assets or business units.13 This is often considered the most effective way to address the anticompetitive effects of a merger because it fundamentally changes the market structure and re-establishes the competitive status quo.23 The AT&T breakup is a prime historical example, and divestiture is the primary remedy sought in the ongoing Google and Meta cases.14 Behavioral Remedies: These remedies impose rules on a company's future conduct without requiring a breakup. An injunction, for example, could prohibit a company from engaging in a specific anticompetitive practice.13 These are often less preferred than structural remedies as they can be difficult to monitor and may not fully restore competition. Monetary Remedies: While the DOJ and FTC do not have the authority to impose civil fines for violations, the system allows for a powerful financial deterrent through private lawsuits.13 Any private party harmed by an antitrust violation can sue for treble damages, which is a recovery of three times the amount of the actual damages incurred.6 This mechanism encourages private enforcement and holds companies accountable for their actions. Remedy Type Description Primary Goal Examples Associated Law(s) Structural Forcing a company to sell off assets or business units (divestiture) To fundamentally change the market structure and re-establish competition The AT&T breakup, remedies sought in Google & Meta cases Clayton Act, Sherman Act Behavioral Imposing rules on a company's conduct without a breakup To stop illegal conduct and prevent its recurrence Injunctions to cease specific practices Sherman Act, Clayton Act, FTC Act Monetary Financial penalties, specifically through private lawsuits To punish wrongdoing and deter future violations Treble damages in private lawsuits Sherman Act, Clayton Act

Chapter 7: Nuanced Perspectives and Concluding Insights

The U.S. approach to monopolies is not without its challenges and ongoing debates. A primary challenge in the digital age is the difficulty of defining the relevant market in fast-moving, multi-sided markets, as seen in the FTC's lawsuit against Meta.20 Another critical debate revolves around proving harm to consumers when the products are "free," which strains the traditional "consumer welfare" standard.16 Finally, courts and agencies must balance the goal of re-establishing competition with the need to avoid harming a company's legitimate efficiency and innovation.13 Based on this analysis, the American model offers several key takeaways. It is not a single "solution" but a system of perpetual adaptation. The journey from the breakup of AT&T to the lawsuits against Google demonstrates a powerful and cyclical nature of antitrust enforcement, where past precedents inform future actions. This is evident in how the government is using the blueprint of the AT&T divestiture to propose structural remedies for modern digital monopolies. While the process can be slow and outcomes uncertain, this public and transparent system creates a powerful deterrent effect. The American model suggests that a truly effective approach to monopolies requires more than just laws on paper. It requires a dedicated and well-resourced enforcement apparatus (the DOJ and FTC), a judiciary willing to interpret and apply the law in a modern context, and a robust public debate about the role of competition in a healthy economy and society. The American model, with its flaws and successes, provides a powerful and actionable blueprint for how a democratic nation can use its legal and institutional powers to prevent the undue concentration of private power. 참고 자료 The Antitrust Laws | Federal Trade Commission, 8월 19, 2025에 액세스, https://www.ftc.gov/advice-guidance/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws Sherman Anti-Trust Act (1890) | National Archives, 8월 19, 2025에 액세스, https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/sherman-anti-trust-act www.law.cornell.edu, 8월 19, 2025에 액세스, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/sherman_antitrust_act#:~:text=Sherman%20Antitrust%20Act%20of%201890,of%20foreign%20or%20interstate%20trade. 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Meta - Wikipedia, 8월 19, 2025에 액세스, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FTC_v._Meta Negotiating Merger Remedies - Federal Trade Commission, 8월 19, 2025에 액세스, https://www.ftc.gov/advice-guidance/competition-guidance/negotiating-merger-remedies