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  3. Genomic Adaptations and Mammary Gland Tropism of HPAI H5N1 in Bovine Hosts: A Paradigm Shift in Zoonotic and Food Safety Risk
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Genomic Adaptations and Mammary Gland Tropism of HPAI H5N1 in Bovine Hosts: A Paradigm Shift in Zoonotic and Food Safety Risk

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Research Report: Genomic Adaptations and Mammary Gland Tropism of HPAI H5N1 in Bovine Hosts: A Paradigm Shift in Zoonotic and Food Safety Risk


Executive Summary

The unprecedented cross-species transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) A virus of the H5N1 subtype into dairy cattle, first identified in March 2024, represents a paradigm-shifting event in influenza ecology and public health. This report synthesizes extensive research to elucidate the specific genomic and biological factors that have enabled this spillover and to analyze how the virus's unique behavior in its new bovine host fundamentally alters existing models for zoonotic risk and food safety.

The outbreak is driven by a specific reassortant H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b virus, designated genotype B3.13. This genotype possesses a constellation of genetic features that confer a fitness advantage in mammalian hosts. Key among these are mutations in the viral polymerase complex, most notably the PB2 M631L substitution, which is present in nearly all cattle isolates and enhances viral replication efficiency in mammalian cells by improving interaction with bovine-specific cellular proteins. While the virus largely retains its preference for avian-type α2,3 sialic acid receptors, subtle adaptations in its hemagglutinin protein, such as the HA T199I mutation, appear to broaden its binding affinity, allowing it to more effectively exploit these receptors which are abundantly expressed in the bovine mammary gland.

The defining characteristic of this outbreak is the virus's profound tropism for bovine mammary tissue. The mammary gland has become a primary site of viral replication, effectively acting as a bioreactor. This leads to the shedding of exceptionally high viral titers—up to 10⁸.⁸ infectious particles per milliliter—into milk. This phenomenon is central to the altered risk landscape, establishing raw milk as a novel and highly potent vector for transmission. This has been directly evidenced by lethal infections in farm cats that consumed contaminated raw milk and by the identification of direct occupational exposure as the source of human infections, which have predominantly presented as conjunctivitis.

The high viral persistence in mammary tissue fundamentally reshapes risk models. Zoonotic spillover risk is no longer confined to avian sources but now includes a widespread, large-bodied mammalian reservoir. Dairy cattle, which co-express both avian-type (α2,3) and human-type (α2,6) sialic acid receptors in key tissues, now join swine as a potential "mixing vessel" for influenza viruses, creating an evolutionary crucible where adaptations favoring human-to-human transmission could arise. The detection of the well-known mammalian-adaptive mutation PB2 E627K in a human case linked to cattle underscores this immediate evolutionary potential.

Food safety models are now starkly bifurcated. The commercial pasteurized dairy supply is confirmed to be safe, as standard pasteurization protocols effectively inactivate the H5N1 virus. Conversely, raw, unpasteurized milk and its derivatives pose a significant and direct public health threat. The virus demonstrates remarkable stability in refrigerated raw milk, remaining infectious for weeks to months, and can survive the 60-day aging process for certain raw-milk cheeses. This necessitates a complete re-evaluation of the risks associated with raw dairy consumption and the adequacy of existing food safety regulations.

In conclusion, the H5N1 outbreak in dairy cattle is not an incidental spillover but a transformative event driven by a synergy of viral adaptation and host susceptibility. It has established a new and dangerous interface between an avian-origin pathogen, a major livestock population, and humans, demanding an urgent and integrated "One Health" approach to surveillance, biosebutecurity, and pandemic preparedness.


Introduction

Since its emergence, Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 has been a pathogen of significant global concern due to its high mortality rate in poultry and its potential for zoonotic transmission to humans. Historically, human infections have been rare, typically resulting from direct, close contact with infected birds. The virus's ecological landscape, however, underwent a dramatic and unprecedented shift in March 2024 with the confirmed outbreak of HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b in dairy cattle herds in the United States. This event marked the first time HPAI H5N1 had been found to cause widespread infection and clinical disease in a major livestock species.

This spillover into a large, geographically dispersed mammalian population with extensive human contact has profound implications for public health, agriculture, and food safety. It raises critical questions about the virus's evolutionary trajectory and its potential to adapt for efficient transmission among mammals, a key prerequisite for a human pandemic. The initial presentation of disease in cattle—characterized by decreased milk production, altered milk consistency, and a pronounced viral tropism for the mammary gland—pointed to a novel disease dynamic that diverges significantly from typical influenza infections.

This research report addresses the comprehensive query: What specific genomic adaptations have facilitated the unprecedented cross-species transmission of HPAI H5N1 into bovine hosts, and how does the high viral persistence in mammary tissue alter current risk models for zoonotic spillover and food safety?

Drawing upon a synthesis of extensive virological, epidemiological, and food safety research, this report aims to provide a definitive analysis of the current situation. It deconstructs the genetic makeup of the bovine-associated H5N1 virus, examines the pathobiology of the infection within the unique environment of the bovine mammary gland, and delineates the cascading consequences for zoonotic transmission pathways, occupational health, food safety, and pandemic risk assessment. This report presents a cohesive narrative that connects the molecular evolution of the virus to the tangible public health challenges it now poses, underscoring the necessity of a unified "One Health" framework to manage this evolving threat.


Key Findings

The investigation into the HPAI H5N1 outbreak in dairy cattle has yielded a series of critical findings that collectively illuminate the mechanisms of viral adaptation and the resulting shift in public health paradigms.

1. Genomic Profile of the Bovine H5N1 Virus: A Reassortant with Mammalian-Adaptive Potential

  • Causative Agent and Genotype: The virus responsible for the outbreak is HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b, specifically a novel reassortant genotype designated B3.13. This genotype emerged from at least two recent reassortment events, creating a 4+4 genetic constellation. Four gene segments (PA, HA, NA, M) originate from a Eurasian avian lineage, while the other four internal gene segments (PB2, PB1, NP, NS) derive from North American non-H5N1 wild bird lineages. This unique genetic backbone appears to be a critical factor in the virus's ability to infect cattle.
  • Key Polymerase Adaptations: A central finding is the near-ubiquitous presence of the PB2 M631L mutation in the viral polymerase subunit across cattle isolates. This substitution is a key mammalian adaptation that enhances polymerase activity and viral replication efficiency within mammalian cells. Its mechanism involves improving the interaction with the host protein ANP32A, which is essential for viral replication, thereby overcoming a common barrier to avian influenza infection in mammals. This adaptation is augmented by other putative mammalian adaptations like PA K497R.
  • Receptor-Binding Properties: While the bovine H5N1 strains largely retain a preference for avian-type α2,3-linked sialic acid receptors, a mutation identified in the hemagglutinin (HA) protein, HA T199I, is believed to increase the flexibility of the receptor-binding site. This adaptation does not switch preference to human-type receptors but rather broadens the virus's ability to bind to a wider array of α2,3-linked glycans, which are highly prevalent in bovine mammary tissue.
  • Emergence of Further Adaptations: The virus is demonstrating ongoing evolution. The well-characterized mammalian-adaptive mutation PB2 E627K, which enhances virulence and replication in mammals, has been identified in a human case directly linked to the cattle outbreak. This signifies that the virus can rapidly acquire further high-risk mutations upon transmission to a human host.

2. The Bovine Mammary Gland: A Novel Niche for Viral Replication and Evolution

  • Pronounced Mammary Tropism: A defining feature of the bovine infection is the virus's strong tropism for the epithelial cells lining the alveoli of the mammary gland. This tissue serves as the primary site of viral replication, effectively functioning as a viral bioreactor.
  • High Viral Loads in Milk: As a direct consequence of this tropism, infected cattle shed exceptionally high titers of infectious virus into their milk. Viral loads have been quantified in the range of 10⁴ to 10⁸.⁸ TCID50/mL, turning raw milk into a highly concentrated and infectious medium.
  • Host Cellular Susceptibility: The susceptibility of the mammary gland is explained by its unique cellular landscape. The epithelial cells co-express both avian-like (α2,3-linked) and human-like (α2,6-linked) sialic acid receptors. This dual-receptor presence creates a highly permissive environment for an avian-origin virus while simultaneously providing a platform for potential adaptation toward a human-receptor preference.
  • Cattle as a "Mixing Vessel": The co-expression of both receptor types establishes dairy cattle as a new potential "mixing vessel" for influenza A viruses, a role traditionally ascribed primarily to swine. This environment could facilitate the reassortment of avian and mammalian influenza viruses, potentially generating novel strains with pandemic potential.

3. Novel Transmission Dynamics and Altered Zoonotic Pathways

  • Milk-Borne Transmission: The high viral load in milk has established raw milk as a primary and efficient vector for transmission. This has been demonstrated by infections and fatalities in other susceptible mammals, such as domestic cats and alpacas, that consumed raw milk from infected cows.
  • Efficient Cow-to-Cow Spread: The virus has proven capable of sustained mammal-to-mammal transmission within and between dairy herds. Key routes include mechanical transmission via contaminated milking equipment and fomites (e.g., workers' hands and clothing), as well as potential "mouth-to-teat" transmission through suckling.
  • Livestock Movement as a Key Driver: The geographic spread of the outbreak across multiple states has been primarily driven by the transportation of infected, often asymptomatic or subclinical, dairy cattle between farms.
  • Elevated Occupational Risk: Dairy farm workers are now a frontline population for zoonotic spillover. The milking parlor environment, with its potential for aerosols and splashes of highly infectious milk, creates a high-risk interface. The confirmed human cases, predominantly presenting with conjunctivitis, have been linked directly to this occupational exposure.

4. Redefined Food Safety Landscape and the Critical Role of Pasteurization

  • Pasteurization as an Effective Firewall: Extensive testing by the FDA, USDA, and academic researchers has consistently validated that standard commercial pasteurization methods, particularly High-Temperature Short-Time (HTST) pasteurization (72°C for 15 seconds), effectively inactivate HPAI H5N1. No viable virus has been detected in retail pasteurized dairy products, confirming the safety of the commercial supply chain.
  • Acute Risk from Raw Milk and Products: Unpasteurized (raw) milk poses a significant and direct food safety risk. The virus exhibits remarkable stability in this medium, remaining infectious for at least five weeks and, in some studies, up to 22 weeks at refrigeration temperatures. This prolonged viability dramatically increases the window for potential consumer exposure.
  • Persistence in Raw Milk Cheeses: Research has shown that infectious H5N1 can survive the 60-day aging process commonly used for raw milk cheeses. This finding challenges the adequacy of traditional, non-thermal food safety controls for mitigating this new viral threat.
  • Asymptomatic Shedding Complicates Surveillance: Infected cows can shed high levels of virus in their milk while showing only mild or no clinical signs. This subclinical shedding complicates on-farm surveillance based on visual inspection and increases the risk of contaminated milk entering the raw milk supply chain undetected.

Detailed Analysis

The emergence of HPAI H5N1 in dairy cattle is a multi-faceted event where viral evolution, host physiology, and modern agricultural practices have converged to create a novel public health threat. A detailed analysis reveals the intricate connections between the virus's genetic makeup, its behavior in the bovine host, and the profound implications for risk assessment.

1. Analysis of Viral Genetics: A Synergistic Toolkit for Bovine Infection

The B3.13 genotype is not merely a random variant; it is a virus equipped with a specific genetic toolkit that facilitated the leap into a new mammalian host. The reassortment event that combined a Eurasian HA/NA/PA/M cassette with a North American internal gene cassette (PB2/PB1/NP/NS) was a foundational step. This genetic mixing provided the raw material for adaptation. The internal genes appear particularly significant, with studies suggesting they confer an ability to partially evade or modulate the bovine interferon response, allowing the virus to establish a foothold before the host's innate immunity can effectively clear the infection.

Upon this reassortant backbone, specific point mutations have acted as crucial fine-tuning instruments. The PB2 M631L mutation is the cornerstone of this adaptation. Unlike the more famous PB2 E627K, which is a general marker of increased virulence in mammals, M631L appears to be a more specific adaptation that enhances polymerase function within the bovine cellular environment. This allows for more efficient hijacking of the host's replication machinery, leading to the robust viral production observed.

Simultaneously, the virus has optimized its entry mechanism without a complete overhaul. The HA T199I mutation represents a subtle but powerful evolutionary strategy. Rather than making the high-risk jump to a human-like (α2,6) receptor preference, which might have reduced its fitness in other hosts, this mutation expands its binding flexibility within the avian-like (α2,3) receptor category. This allows it to more efficiently bind to the diverse α2,3-linked glycans found on bovine mammary cells, solidifying its tropism for this tissue. This strategy of "improving what you know" likely contributed to its initial success in establishing a productive infection in the udder.

The ongoing nature of this evolution is perhaps the most concerning aspect. The detection of the PB2 E627K mutation in a human worker infected by a cow demonstrates that once the virus bridges the species gap, it can rapidly acquire mutations of high pandemic concern. The infected bovine population thus serves as a massive reservoir where these evolutionary experiments can occur on an unprecedented scale.

2. Pathobiology of Mammary Gland Infection: The Bioreactor Effect

The bovine mammary gland has emerged as the central theater of this outbreak. Its biological landscape is uniquely conducive to HPAI H5N1 replication. The high-density co-expression of both α2,3 and α2,6 sialic acid receptors on alveolar epithelial cells makes it a uniquely "permissive" environment. This dual receptor availability means the virus did not require a major adaptive leap in its receptor-binding domain to initiate infection; it could effectively use its native preference for α2,3 receptors, which are abundant.

Once inside, the mammary gland acts as a protected site, somewhat isolated from the systemic immune response, allowing for persistent and high-level replication. This transforms the udder from a milk-producing organ into a viral bioreactor. The resulting high viral titers are not merely a clinical sign; they are the engine driving the new transmission dynamics.

The stability of the virus within the milk matrix is another critical factor. Milk, with its high fat and protein content, provides a protective environment that shields the virus from degradation. The finding that H5N1 can remain viable for months under refrigeration means that raw milk is not just a transient vector but a long-term biohazard. This has been confirmed by animal model studies where consumption of infected raw milk led to systemic disease and death in mice, demonstrating that ingestion is a viable, and potent, route of infection for some mammals.

3. Epidemiological Shift: From Avian- to Bovine-Centric Transmission

This outbreak has fundamentally rewritten the epidemiology of H5N1. The established paradigm of avian-to-human transmission via respiratory or fecal-oral routes has been supplemented, and in this context, overshadowed, by a new mammal-to-mammal cycle centered on the dairy farm.

The modern dairy, with its reliance on shared milking equipment, creates a near-perfect mechanism for rapid, mechanical intra-herd transmission. A single infected cow can contaminate the milking cluster, which then acts as a fomite to infect dozens of other cows in succession. This explains the rapid spread within herds.

The primary driver of the virus's geographic expansion has been the movement of livestock. The ability of cattle to be infectious while appearing healthy (subclinical infection) means that animals are often moved between farms and across states before their infectious status is known. This has allowed the virus to leapfrog hundreds of miles, turning what might have been localized outbreaks into a national animal health emergency.

This epidemiological shift has placed a new demographic—dairy farm workers—at the forefront of zoonotic risk. The milking parlor, a humid environment where splashing is unavoidable, has become a high-risk zoonotic interface. The case of conjunctivitis in a worker following a milk splash provides clear, direct evidence of a non-respiratory route of human infection and highlights the immense viral load to which these workers are exposed.

4. Recalibrating Public Health Risk: A Paradigm Shift in Zoonosis and Food Safety

The biological realities of H5N1 in dairy cattle render many existing risk assessment models obsolete, necessitating a complete recalibration.

Zoonotic Spillover Models:

  • New Reservoir Host: Models must now incorporate dairy cattle as a significant, widespread amplification host, not an incidental or dead-end host. This vastly increases the scope of the animal-human interface.
  • New Transmission Routes: Transmission probabilities must be recalculated to include high-titer exposure through ingestion (of raw milk) and direct mucosal contact (splashes), particularly for occupational groups. The high concentration of virus in milk makes it a potent contaminant for fomites and aerosols in the farm environment.
  • "Mixing Vessel" Potential: The probability of reassortment events leading to a pandemic-capable virus must be significantly increased in risk models. The sheer number of cattle globally, combined with their dual-receptor status, presents a larger and more complex mixing-vessel scenario than previously considered with swine alone.

Food Safety Models:

  • Binary Risk Profile: Food safety frameworks must now operate on a clear, binary model for dairy: negligible risk for pasteurized products and high, unquantified risk for raw milk and its derivatives.
  • Quantitative Parameter Updates: Models assessing raw milk risk must be updated with new, empirically derived parameters:
    • Initial Viral Load: Use observed titers up to 10⁸.⁸ TCID50/mL.
    • Viral Persistence: The infectious period of the product must be extended to reflect a viability of up to 22 weeks under refrigeration.
    • Subclinical Contamination: The probability of virus entering the supply from asymptomatic animals must be increased, challenging surveillance systems based solely on clinical signs.
  • Re-evaluation of Traditional Processes: The assumption that traditional methods like the 60-day aging for raw cheese are sufficient to mitigate viral pathogens must be scientifically re-validated for H5N1.

Discussion

The spillover of HPAI H5N1 into dairy cattle is a quintessential "One Health" crisis, where the health of animals, humans, and the environment are inextricably linked. The findings synthesized in this report illustrate a cascade of events, beginning at the molecular level with viral evolution and culminating in major challenges for global public health and food systems.

The most profound implication is the establishment of cattle as a new and highly effective reservoir and "mixing vessel" for influenza A virus. For decades, the public health community has focused on swine as the primary intermediate host where avian and human viruses could reassort. The addition of a globally ubiquitous livestock species like cattle to this list dramatically expands the potential for the emergence of a novel pandemic virus. The bovine mammary gland, with its unique dual-receptor profile and its capacity for sustained viral replication, provides a novel evolutionary arena. This is no longer a theoretical risk; the detection of the PB2 E627K mutation in a human case linked to cattle is a real-time demonstration of this adaptive process in action.

This event forces a fundamental rethinking of biosecurity in animal agriculture. The role of fomites, particularly shared milking equipment, and the movement of subclinical animals have been exposed as critical vulnerabilities in modern dairy operations. The virus has effectively exploited the efficiencies of industrial agriculture to facilitate its own spread. This highlights an urgent need for enhanced biosecurity protocols, improved diagnostics that can detect pre-symptomatic infection, and a re-evaluation of livestock transportation regulations during active outbreaks.

Furthermore, the H5N1 situation has thrust the debate over raw milk consumption from a niche food safety issue into the mainstream of pandemic preparedness. While pasteurization stands as a robust public health firewall, the persistent risk from raw milk creates a direct, albeit self-selected, pathway for human exposure. Public health messaging must be unequivocal about the dangers of consuming unpasteurized dairy products, especially in regions with known viral circulation in cattle. The prolonged viability of the virus in raw milk and cheese presents a formidable challenge for regulators and consumers alike.

The mildness of the initial human infections (predominantly conjunctivitis) presents a deceptive picture. While fortunate for the individuals affected, mild or asymptomatic infections could allow the virus to circulate cryptically within the human population, affording it more opportunities to adapt to efficient human-to-human transmission. Each new human infection, regardless of severity, is a roll of the evolutionary dice. Therefore, protecting the health of farm workers through enhanced personal protective equipment (PPE), proactive surveillance, and rapid access to diagnostics and antivirals is not only an occupational health imperative but a critical component of global pandemic prevention.


Conclusions

The cross-species transmission of HPAI H5N1 into dairy cattle is a landmark event in the history of influenza, fundamentally altering our understanding of the virus's host range, evolutionary potential, and transmission dynamics. This report concludes that this spillover was not a random accident but was facilitated by a specific and synergistic combination of viral genetic adaptations and unique biological vulnerabilities in the bovine host.

1. A Synergistic Combination of Adaptations Drove the Spillover: The transmission was enabled by the reassortant B3.13 genotype, which provided a genetic backbone conducive to mammalian infection. This was potentiated by key mutations, notably PB2 M631L, which optimized viral replication in bovine cells, and subtle HA mutations that enhanced binding to α2,3 receptors abundant in the mammary gland.

2. The Mammary Gland is the Central Driver of the Altered Risk Landscape: The virus's profound tropism for the bovine mammary gland is the single most important factor in this outbreak. This unique biological niche has transformed the udder into a viral bioreactor, leading to unprecedented viral shedding in milk. This has established raw milk as a potent transmission vector, created a new high-risk occupational environment for farm workers, and positioned cattle as a formidable new "mixing vessel" for influenza viruses.

3. Existing Risk Models are Obsolete and Require Urgent Revision: The dynamics of the bovine outbreak have rendered previous risk models for zoonotic spillover and food safety inadequate. Zoonotic risk models must now incorporate a widespread mammalian amplifying host, novel transmission pathways via milk and fomites, and the heightened potential for viral evolution towards pandemic capability. Food safety models must enforce a strict binary distinction: the demonstrated safety of pasteurized dairy products versus the significant, direct viral exposure risk posed by raw milk and its derivatives.

In moving forward, a robust and integrated "One Health" response is not optional but essential. This requires strengthening the collaboration between veterinary and public health authorities to conduct comprehensive surveillance in both animal and human populations. Enhanced biosecurity on farms, restrictions on livestock movement during outbreaks, and clear public health communication about the risks of raw milk are immediate priorities. The H5N1 outbreak in dairy cattle serves as a stark warning of the ever-present threat of zoonotic disease emergence at the human-animal interface and underscores the critical importance of proactive global preparedness to mitigate the risk of a future influenza pandemic.

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